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In November 1995, the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops unanimously approved the Ethical and Religious Directives
(hereinafter, ERD) .1 While most recent attention has centered on the

"Appendix" where the principle of cooperation is outlined, that
seventeenth·century principle is hardly innovative. Rather, there are
five places within the directives that any reader would find new.
First, Kevin Wildes, in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal,
argues that the only innovation in the ERD is that the ecclesiology is
from the top down.2 [n these Directives, the local bi shop is certainly
more evident than any earlier Directi ves: the bi shops assume a highly
visible place in the ERD. For instance, in the " General Introduction,"
the bishop is seen in his office as exercising a classic, three-fo ld role as
pastor, teacher and priest. These three roles in tum lead to three
responsibilities that bishops have in health care mini stry .
As the center of un ity in the diocese and coordinator of ministries
in the local Church, the diocesan bishop fosters the mission of
Catho lic health care in a way that promotes collaboration among
health care leaders. providers. medica l profess ionals,
theologians, and other specialislS. As pastor. the diocesan bishop
is in a unique position to encourage the faithful to greater
responsibility in (he healing ministry in whatever sening it is
carried out in the diocese. As priest. the diocesan bishop
oversees the sacramental care of the sick.
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Concretely these responsibilities mean. for instance. that the bishop is
consulted for the appointment of the pastoral care director (ERD, 21);
if the director is not Catho li c, the bishop's approval is needed (ERD,
22). Likewise the bishop appoints any priests or deacons to the pastoral
care staff (ERD, 2 1). Wildes is right to recognize the role given to the
bishops. That role was established because the bishops understood
themselves as the final guarantors of the Catholic identity, mi ssion and
values of the health care facilities in their own diocese.
Though the bishops understand themselves as final guarantors
of the hea1th care facilities ' Catholic identity, mi ssion and values they
hardly consider themselves the first guarantors. In the "General
Introduction," they recognize that most Catholic health care facilities
have been founded by religious women who sought to continue the
mi ssion of Jesus in healing and caring for those who are sick.
Likewise, they recognize how those religious women and men are now
involved in co llaborative ministries with lay persons.
Moreover, the bishops also do not consider themselves the more
immediate guarantors of the health care facilities' Catholic identity,
mission and values. This can be seen, for instance, by comparing
earlier drafts on hospital ethics committees with the final, approved
text. Earlier, the bishops considered appointing hospital ethics
committees or, at least, the committee' s ethicists. Instead, after
describing the work of these committees in advising and reviewing
hospital policies and procedures, they added "there should be
appropriate standards for medical ethical consultation within a
particular diocese that will respect the diocesan bishop' s pastoral
responsibility as well as assist members of ethics committees to be
familiar with Catholic medical ethics and, in particular, those
directives." (ERD, 37) Here we see the health care faci lity then serving
as the responsible agent in carrying out the directives. Those within the
faci li ty "must respect and uphold the religious mission of the institution
and uphold these directives." (ERD, 9). In fact, the entire first part
assumes and underlines that the ones most immediately and directly
responsible for shaping, protecting and promoting the Catholic identity,
mi ssion and values of the facility are those working within the facility,
not the chancery! (ERD, 1-9)
Thus, Wildes is right to note the particular role of bishops, but
Wildes misses the real concern: that is, in an age of pluralism and
34
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increasing diversity, the importance of guaranteeing Catholic identity,
mission and values. Though the bishops wrote, approved and
promulgated ERD, they clearly recognized that they were not the
singular guarantors of the Catholic presence in health care. Rather they
saw themselves with others who have continuously exercised their own
leadership as founders and guarantors of that ministry. Throughout the
document, then, we find a call for those working within both health
care facilities and chanceries to be in dialogue with one another and
sensitive to the respective competencies of each other. Again, we find
in the "General Introduction," "The responsibilities will require that
Catholic health care providers and the diocesan bi shop engage in ongoing communication on ethical and pastoral matters that require his
attention."
Thus we need to see that while the role of the bi shop is
vigorously present in the Directives that role is a very spec ific one
among others. For this reason, anyone reading part six, "Fonning New
Partnerships with Health Care Organizations and Providers," will
recognize that while the role of the bishop is clearly apparent, his final
authority does not compromise the first and more immediate
competency of those in the facility. The call to the bishop to be
attentive to his responsibility to promote and protect the facilities'
Catholic identity, mission, and values is at once a call to the facilities'
own administrators and employees to no less guarantee that mini stry.
This insight leads then into an appreciation of the second
innovation which John Gallagher describes in a wonderful essay in
Review for Rehgious.) There he comments on the five narrati ve
sections of ERD. While these narrative sections are certainly a major
innovation, Gallagher recognizes that they are not simply stylistic
changes. Rather he comments on the ecclesiology that is provided in
these sections. He contends that there is a considerable shift from
earlier ideas of the Church that described priests and religious working
the Church's ministry while lay people worked in the world's political
work. This dichotomy is overcome in the directives where lay mini stry
is integrated into the Church ' s mi ssion. 4 Rightly, Gallagher insists that
this extension of the laity into mini stry is not "regrettable" or some
" last resort" measure, but rather an attempt to follow the Spirit: the
shared ministry is not a pragmatic patchwork, but a vision of the
Church's proper ministries. Thus, he suggests that thi s more inclusive
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ecclesiology ought to guide those sharing in this ministry to develop a
new self-understanding of their own roles as "Heralds of the Gospel."s
Gallagher provides, then, a healthy and insightful corrective to
Wildes' complaint: the protection and promotion of Catholic identity,
mi ssion and values in the health care arena is a task for all who share
in the labor of Catholic health care facilities. Finally, the Catholic
Health Care Association developed this insight with extraordinary
vision in their 1996 Annual Conference entitled, «Enacting the New
Covenant."
Third, Gallagher also notes a nod to the common good in ERD
insofar as certain directives (56 and 57) say that excessive expenses to
the family or the community could make a proportionate burden a
disproportionate one. While this is an astute observation, Gallagher's
recognition needs to be tempered by certain other concerns that the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops recognized. Notably, in order
to protect patients, ERD anticipated the attempts of certain managed
care insurers who would tty to deny payments to a patient precisely by
invoking these directives. Thus, these same directives (56 and 57) as
well as an earlier one (32) insist that the arbiter who determines a
disproportionate mean is the patient alone. No one else can make this
election. Thus, if the patient considers the services being delivered to
her as unreasonably expensive for her family or her community, then
she alone may reasonably opt to consider the means as
di sproportionate. The innovation then is not simply a nod to the
common good. Rather it is an attempt to achieve a prudential balance:
in the era of HMOs, ERD does not shrink from upholding concern for
the common good as part of the calculus of extraordinary versus
ordinary care, but it also does not fail to protect the patient's own health
care and own obligation to make ri ght moral deci sions in conscience.
Fourth, this leads to what I consider the most important shift in
the revised directives: this is a remarkable change from a best interest
model of decision making to the responsible patient wishes model. The
fonner model is based on the premise that only those who are medically
competent determine a patient 's course of treatment. This model
predominated in much of Catholic medical ethics. It meant basically
that a physician (and sometimes a priest or ethicist) determined what
constituted extraordinary or ordinary carc.
In ERD , the patient and not the health care prov ider is the
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primary decision maker. Three steps are taken to insure a responsible
patient wishes model. First, ERD stipulates repeatedly in directives 24
and 28 (and implicitly in 25 and 59) that no Catholic Health Care
facility is obliged to provide to any patient services that conflict with
ERD or Catholic moral principles. These prohibitions, however, are
fewer than we realize, e.g., abortion, sterilizations, assisted suicide,
certain reproductive technologies. If the prohibited are few and
spec ific, then the parameters of the permitted are considerably broad.
Thus, second, within the context of the permitted, the patient singularly
decides about her care. This is reiterated repeated ly (ERD, 25, 26, 27,
28,32, 56, 59). Thus, it is the patient who determines what constitutes
extraordinary means. We read, " While every person is obliged to use
ordinary means to preserve his or her health, no person should be
obliged to submit to a health care procedure that the person has judged.
with a free and informed conscience, not to provide a reasonable hope
of benefit without imposing excessive risks and burdens on the patient
or excessive risks and burdens on the patient or excessive expense to
family or community." (ERO, 25)
Moreover, ERD explicitly imposes on designated surrogates the
primary responsibili ty of representing the patient ' s wishes and not to
make " best interest" deci sions. Thus, if a physician, nurse, priest or
ethicist advise a surrogate that a particular course of treatment is from
their point of view preferable, the surrogate must in conscience adhere
to the patient's wishes, provided that they do not conflict with ERD or
any other Catholic moral teaching. The surrogate can onl y tum to the
claims or best interest when there is no evidence of the patient's own
wi shes (ERD, 25).
Furthermore, ERD upholds this shift even in the event that a
surrogate has not been appointed and no advanced directive is
available6, then "those who are in a posit ion to know best the patient' s
wishes - usually family members and loved ones - should participate in
the treatment decisions for the person who has lost the capacity to make
health care decisions." (E RO , 25).
Finall y, this shift is based on the prem ise that the patient ' s
decision-making is not an action based on a freedom from the truth, but
on an obligation to pursue the true: ? the patient is not free in
consc ience to pursue whatever she wishes, rather she is required to
make a responsible decision. Therefore, the health care professionals
February, 1998

37

are required to inform her properly to accomplish this task: "'Free and
informed consent requires that the person or the person's surrogate
receive all reasonable information about the essential nature of the
proposed treatment and its benefits; its risks, side-effects,
consequences, and cost; and any reasonable and morally legitimate
alternatives, including no treatment at all. " (ERD, 27).
Readers of ERD should see that the assertion of an individual
as the proper decision-maker is not rooted in the ubiquitous American
principle of autonomy. That principle argues that the agent should be
free from all sorts of encroachments. Rather, Catholic teaching is
rooted in the dignity of the human person. From that dignity, a person
is obliged in conscience to determine what God wants from her. The
primacy of our obligation to conscience drives this turn to patient
wishes. "The inherent dignity of the human person must be respected
and protected regardless of the nature of the person's health problem or
social status. The respect for human dignity extends to all persons who
are served by Catholic health care." (ERD, 23).
ERD's final innovation is the actual crafting of the particular
directives. Recognizing that the articulation of moral judgments is an
on-going process of trying to determine the truth as we come to
understand more clearly the complexities that lie before us,s ERD often
set the parameters for right action, rather than actually determining
specific procedures. One such instance is the question of whether
artificial hydration and nutrition for patients in persistent vegetative
constitutes extraordinary versus ordinary means. Rather than "settling"
this question, we find ERD, in the narrative of part five, "Issues in Care
for the Dying," presenting on the one side the wrongness of euthanasia
and on the other side instances when such means are clearly
extraordinary. Then, turning specifica1ly to the question, ERD reminds
the reader of the distinction between those "questions already resolved
by the magisterium and those requiring further reflection. " While
stating the "presumption" to provide such means, ERD clearly
recognizes that this is not an absolute requirement (ERD, 58).
ERD also faced the question of ending the life-threatening
ectopic pregnancy. Not wanting to persist in invoking the principle of
double effect which led to an unnecessaty tuballigation,9 ERD simply
wrote, "In case of extrauterine pregnancy, no intervention is morally
licit which constitutes a direct abortion." (ERD, 48). Undoubtedly,
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Catholic moralists will try now to find a proper way of responding to
an extrauterine pregnancy that on the one hand does not constitute a
direct abortion and on the other hand avoids hanning the woman' s

body.IO
This method of "outlining" detenninations. by stipulating the
boundaries of what is prohibited, but encouraging health care facilities
and ethicists to find proper resolutions congruent with Church teaching
can be found throughout the document. In particular, it is evident in the
rape protocol (ERD, 36), prenatal diagnoses (ERD, 50), and medical
research on children (ERD, 51). But also it governs the entire section
on dying as well as the entire section on cooperation. ERD requires
then an attentive eye and a willingness to pursue right courses of action
responsibly within licit ambits. It is a document for the times we live

m.
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